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TAXATION
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") to raise revenue
and implement social and economic policy.' Where the Code contains ambig-
uous or underinclusive language, the courts must interpret its meaning and, at
times, its policy objectives. As with most statutes enacted by Congress, many
sections of the Code are open to numerous interpretations.' The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard and decided several cases in which the court had to
interpret the Code's language during the 1995-96 survey period.3 This Survey
begins by providing a general background of taxation and the Internal Revenue
Code in Part I. Part II discusses United States v. Reorganized CF&J Fabrica-
tors.4 In CF&J, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision
which held that the Code's funding-deficiency tax5 is not an excise tax for
priority purposes under federal bankruptcy law,6 but reversed the Tenth
Circuit's categorical subordination of the Internal Revenue Service's (the "Ser-
vice") tax claim.7 The Supreme Court looked beyond the Code's language to
determine the nature of § 4971(a) assessments, but limited courts' ability to
expand equitable subordination beyond the confines of statutory language.'
The Survey concludes with Part HI, which examines the Tenth Circuit's
interpretation, in two cases, of the Code provision which places a 100% penal-
ty on responsible persons who fail to pay over to the government withheld
employment taxes.9
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Taxes are a vital component of organized society.' ° Ancient societies
imposed taxes and developed methods to ensure their collection." Taxes pro-
1. JOSEPH A. PEcHMAN, FEDERAL TAx PoLIcY 5 (1987).
2. JOHN C. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 10 (2d ed. 1973).
3. The survey period includes decisions of the Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1995,
and August 31, 1996.
4. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1995).
5. 26 U.S.C. § 4971 (1994).
6. 26 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (interpreting the original 26 U.S.C. §
507(a)(7) which has since been amended to § 507(a)(8)).
7. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. 2106, 2115 (1996).
8. Id.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1994); Bradshaw v. United States, 83 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995);
Taylor v. IRS, 69 F.3d 411 (10th Cir. 1995).
10. DANIEL Q. PosmN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 33 (2d ed. 1993). "Our
Founding Fathers believed that the power to tax was quintessential for the proper governance of
our country." David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REv. 17. 19 (1995).
11. PosmN, supra note 10, at 33. In ancient Sumer, the first organized society of record, the
payment of taxes was ensured by religious sanction. Id. at 33-34. In ancient Greece, taxes were
imposed upon the Athenian upper classes to finance the coups d'etat of 411 and 404 B.C. Id.
533
DENVER UNIVERSTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2
vide for government administration and military defense,' 2 and attempt to
achieve social and economic change.' 3
The Constitution gives Congress the "Power To lay and collect Taxes."' 4
Tax bills begin in the House and then transfer to the Senate. 5 The legislators
compromise between competing social and economic interests before promul-
gating tax legislation. 6 Today's tax system evolved from legislation present
at the country's inception." The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is used to-
day.' Protest against taxation has an interesting history in the United States.
From the Boston Tea Party 9 to the Montana Freemen, " citizens have im-
plemented violent measures to avoid tax payment. Today, when a conflict
between the taxpayer and government arises, several legal avenues are open to
settle the dispute. The taxpayer can pay the deficiency, and in turn sue for a
refund in a District Court; or the taxpayer may petition the United States Tax
Court for a trial.2' The taxpayer or Service may appeal to the proper Court of
Appeals.'
The Code has grown from a document of sixteen pages to a mass of com-
plex regulations. 2' The complexity of tax law results from the sheer size of
12. Id. at 33. Taxation provided resources which allowed the United States to become a
world power. CHOMMIE, supra note 2, at 1.
13. PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 5. Taxes shift resources to the public sector, apportion gov-
ernmental costs among people based upon their economic situation, and facilitate "economic
growth, stability, and efficiency." Id. High taxes coupled with low government spending combats
inflation by constricting private demand. Low taxes coupled with high expenditures combat reces-
sion by increasing private demand. Id. at 8. Taxes allow the government to influence national
economic and social institutions. CHoMMIE, supra note 2, at 1.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 1.
15. PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 44. "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art I, § 7. Tax proposals begin in the Treasury and other
federal agencies. The President makes recommendations to Congress, where they are reviewed by
two tax committees and sent to the House and Senate. PEcHMAN, supra note 1, at 44-53. Taxation
is assigned to a joint congressional committee. The Joint Committee on Taxation contains five
members of the House Ways and Means Committee and five members of the Senate Finance
Committee, three each from the majority party and two each from the minority party. Id. at 38-39.
For a more detailed description of the taxation legislation process, see CHOMMIE, supra note 2, at
8-10.
16. PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 38-39. Political, economic, and social groups attempi to
pressure the Treasury, the tax committees, and the President to gain an advantage in taxation leg-
islation. Id. at 38.
17. Id. at 39.
18. Id. The 1986 Code is comprised of the 1954 Code as amended by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2095 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9722 (1994)).
19. In 1773, men boarded ships of the British East India Company and tossed tea overboard
to protest the tea tax imposed by British Parliament. PosIN, supra note 10, at 34-35.
20. FBI agents surrounded a Freemen compound in Montana for 81 days attempting to ap-
prehend the Freemen for committing various crimes, including tax evasion. Carey Goldberg, The
Freemen Sought Refuge in an Ideology That Kept the Law, and Reality, at Bay, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 1996, at 14.
21. CHOimmE, supra note 2, at 14-15. The Tax Court does not provide for a jury trial. Id. at
15.
22. Id. The case may continue on to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
23. Id. at 10. The current Code consists of 800 pages which contain over 250,000 words. Id.
Difficult provisions treating corporations as separate entities, increasing rates on ordinary income,
giving privileges to certain economic classes, and closing loopholes have increased the complexity
of the Code. Id. at 10-11.
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the regulations which govern it and the large number of people it directly
effects. 4 Taxation effects the lives of more Americans than perhaps any oth-
er area of the law.'
H. TAX CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Code contains rules, called priorities, which determine the
order in which to pay creditors from the bankrupt's limited pool of resourc-
es.26 Unsecured compensatory excise tax claims of the government receive
eighth priority.' A penalty claim, however, receives priority only if it is a
pecuniary loss penalty.' A § 726(a)(4) noncompensatory penalty is subor-
dinated to all general, unsecured claims.' Taxpayers have heavily litigated
the Service's assessments to determine whether they are punitive or compen-
satory.3
24. POsiN, supra note 10, at 39-40. In the early 1990's, over 90 million tax returns were
filed annually in the United States. Id. The Service employed 120,000 in 1990. Laro, supra note
10, at 21.
25. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1943). "No other branch of the law
touches human activities at so many points" as tax law. Id. at 494-95.
26. Lee A. Sheppard, Bankruptcy Tax Policy: How Far Should Equitable Subordination
Go?, 8 TAX PRAC. 356, 357 (1995). Secured claims come before unsecured claims. Id. Claims
arising out of the bankruptcy administration receive first priority. Id.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 1997). Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides:
(a) [t]he following expenses and claims have priority in the following order.
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of the governmental units, only to the
extent that such claims are for...
(E) an Excise Tax on-
(i) a transaction occurring before the date of
the filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, under applicable law
or under any extension, after three years before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) if a return is not required, a transaction occurring during the three years im-
mediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.
Id.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(G) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1994). Section 726(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be distrib-
uted
(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order speci-
fied in section 507 of this title .....
(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for
any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damag-
es... to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim
(6) sixth, to the debtor.
Id.
30. Sheppard, supra note 26, at 357. Several courts have addressed whether a tax labeled as
an excise tax should be granted priority under § 50(a)(8)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code or subordi-
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An example of a contentious category of assessments are those levied
against pension plans. The Code requires that employers meet funding require-
ments for pension plans qualified under Code §§ 401(a) and 403(a).3 The
Code places an excise tax on employers who fail to fund pension plans as re-
quired.32 The assessment is located in a subsection entitled "Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes." If the language of this title defines the nature of the assessment
for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the government would receive eighth
priority. If, however, the assessment is a penalty, it would not receive priority
under the Bankruptcy Code because it does not compensate for pecuniary loss.
The legislative history of this section suggests Congress intended this excise
tax be punitive in nature.3 Commentators, however, have found the history
vague and inconclusive.'
nated as a penalty, if the true nature of the exaction is a penalty under § 726(a)(4). See generally
United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991); Unified Control
Systems Inc. v. IRS, 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978); Kline v. Feinblatt, 403 F. Supp. 974 (D. Md.
1975).
31. 26 U.S.C. § 412 (1994). Section 412 provides:
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (h), this section applies to a plan if,
for any plan year beginning on or after the effective date of this section for such plan-
(I) such plan included a trust which qualified (or was determined by the Sec-
retary to have qualified) under section 401(a), or
(2) such plan satisfied (or was determined by the Secretary to have satisfied)
the requirements of section 403(a).
A plan to which this section applies shall have satisfied the minimum funding
standard for such plan year if, as of the end of such plan year, the plan does not have an
accumulated funding deficiency. For purposes of this section and section 4971, the term
"accumulated funding deficiency" means for any plan, the excess of the total charges
over the funding standard account for all plan years (beginning with the first plan year
to which this section applies) over the total credits to such account for such years or, if
less, the excess of the total charges to the alternative minimum funding standard account
for such plan years over the total credits to such account for such years. In any plan
year in which a multiemployer plan is in reorganization, the accumulated funding defi-
ciency of the plan shall be determined under section 418B.
Id.
32. 26 U.S.C. § 4971 (1994). Section 4971 provides for taxes on those who fail to meet
minimum funding standards:
(a) Initial tax. For each taxable year of an employer who maintains a plan to which
section 412 applies, there is hereby imposed a tax of 10 percent (5 percent in the case of
a multiemployer plan) on the amount of the accumulated funding deficiency under the
plan, determined as of the end of the plan year ending with or within such taxable year.
(b) Additional tax. In any case in which an initial tax is imposed by subsection (a) on an
accumulated funding deficiency and such accumulated funding deficiency is not correct-
ed within the taxable period, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 100 percent of such
accumulated funding deficiency to the extent not corrected.
Id.
33. The legislative history describes the statute's purpose:
The [committee] bill also provides new and more effective penalties where em-
ployers fail to meet the funding standards. In the past, an attempt has been made to
enforce the relatively weak funding standards existing under present law by providing
for immediate vesting of the employees' rights, to the extent funded, under plans which
do not meet these standards. This procedure, however, has proved to be defective since
it does not directly penalize those responsible for the underfunding. For this reason, the
bill places the obligation for funding and the penalty for underfunding on the person on
whom it belongs--namely the employer. This is achieved by imposing an excise tax
where the employer fails to meet the funding standards.
S. REP. No. 93-406, pt. I (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4909-10.
34. See Laurie F. Humphrey, Comment, In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Company: A Penalty
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The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.,3"
became the first, and remains the only circuit to hold that a tax under §
507(a)(7)(E)-now § 507(a)(8)(E)--receives priority against unsecured claims.
Relying upon the statutory construction method used by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,' the Mansfield
court found that because Congress gave priority to excise taxes, courts should
conclude that Congress knowingly used the terms and should grant these taxes
priority.'
In Unified Control Systems v. 1RS,3 the Fifth Circuit stated that "the
label placed upon an imposition in a revenue measure is [not] decisive in de-
termining its character [as a tax or penalty]."39 The court found that § 4941
excise taxes were penalties and not allowed as claims.'
In Cassidy v. Dumler,'4 the Tenth Circuit held that a § 72(t) tax is puni-
tive in nature and may be equitably subordinated.42 Thus, the Cassidy court
rejected the Sixth Circuit's analysis on this issue, relying instead on the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning.43
Bankruptcy courts may deviate from congressionally established distribu-
tion rules.' The Bankruptcy Code provides for equitable subordination.45
Courts now apply equitable subordination in cases where a claim holder acts
in good faith.'
By Any Other Name Is Not a Penalty, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1069, 1081 (1992) (stating that
"the legislative history of section 507 is inconclusive at best"). But see David L. Kwass, Note,
Excise Taxes in Bankruptcy: United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. Holds Congress to Its
Word, 12 VA. TAX REv. 513, 521 n.40 (1993) (suggesting two grounds with which to attack the
legislative history argument).
35. 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991).
36. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
37. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d at 1059. The Sixth Circuit said, "[wihere Con-
gress has exercised its constitutional power and deemed an exaction an 'excise tax', the question
has been answered." Id. at 1059.
38. 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. Unified Control Sys., 586 F.2d at 1037.
40. Id. at 1039 (holding that granting priority to excise taxes "would thwart the congressio-
nal purpose to honor such assessments over the claims of entirely innocent creditors, except inso-
far as the government can show pecuniary loss").
41. 983 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1992).
42. Cassidy, 983 F.2d at 165. The Tenth Circuit relied upon Supreme Court decisions in
which the Court held that the name given to an exaction by the state legislature is not conclusive.
Id. at 163. The Court rejected appellant's contention that these cases did not apply to federal exac-
tions. Id.
43. 983 F.2d at 162.
44. Sheppard, supra note 26, at 357.
45. See Id. Section 5 10(c) provides:
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing,
the court may-
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed
interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to
the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994).
46. Sheppard, supra note 26, at 357.
1997]
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In In re Virtual Network Services Corp,47 the Seventh Circuit expanded
equitable subordination. As courts were invoking equitable subordination at the
time of ratification, the court found that Congress ratified subordination when
it enacted the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.' Other circuits have also held that
they may equitably subordinate pre-petition tax penalties to other creditor's
claims.49
B. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators'
1. Facts
CF&I Fabricators sponsored two qualified pension plans which they did
not adequately fund as required by Code § 412.11 CF&I later filed for Bank-
ruptcy under Chapter I L" The Service filed proofs of claim, and assessed a
ten percent tax under § 4971 on the funding deficiency. 3 The Service sought
priority treatment in post-bankruptcy distributions under § 507(a)(7)(E)-now
§ 507(a)(8)(E).54 The Bankruptcy Court found that the tax liability was not an
excise tax under § 507," and accepted CF&I's reorganization plan which
placed the government in the lowest priority.56 Upon the government's ap-
peal, the District Court for the District of Utah affirmed. 7
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
Declaring the analysis set forth in Cassidy as binding precedent, the Tenth
Circuit found that the Bankruptcy Court correctly looked beyond the statutory
47. 902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990).
48. In re Virtual Network Serv. Corp., 902 F.2d at 1249-50. The Seventh Circuit went on to
find "that § 510(c)(1) authorizes courts to equitably subordinate claims to other claims on a case-
by-case basis without requiring in every instance inequitable conduct on the part of the creditor
claiming parity among other unsecured general creditors." Id. at 1250.
49. See Burden v. United States, 917 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 510(c)
permits this subordination); Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States, 912 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1990)
(using legislative history of § 510(c) to support subordination of government tax claims).
50. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1995).
51. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1156 [CF&I Fabricators]. In September of
1990, CF&I failed to contribute a required $12.4 million to the plans for the taxable year ending
December 31, 1989. Id.
52. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. 2106, 2109 (1996) [Reorga-
nized CF&I Fabricators]. CF&I filed in its attempt to reorganize, largely because of an inability
to meet the funding requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1001. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In the alternative, the Government sought to prioritize its claim as a tax penalty in
compensation for pecuniary loss under § 507(a). Id.
55. Id. The bankruptcy court read § 4971 as creating a noncompensatory penalty. Id.
56. Id. at 2109-10.
57. Id. at 2110. CF&I created a reorganization plan placing the § 4971 claim in a special
class for "nonpecuniary loss penalties" before the appeal was heard. Id. The District Court af-
firmed the court's decision to look beyond the words of the statute and the subordination. Id.
[Vol. 74:2
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label.5" The court then turned to equitable subordination. 9 The court said
that other courts apply equitable subordination only when a creditor has com-
mitted a wrongdoing,' but followed the Seventh Circuit's contrary reason-
ing.6' The Tenth Circuit held that "§ 510(c)(1) does not require a finding of
claimant misconduct to subordinate nonpecuniary loss tax penalty claims." 2
3. United States Supreme Court Decision
6 3
The Court relied upon the congressional purpose in creating § 4971.
Looking beyond the statutory language, the Court found that Congress intend-
ed § 4971 as a penalty and not an excise tax. 4 Because the language of §
4971 does not contain the term "excise" and because "characterizations in
the Internal Revenue' Code are not dispositive in the bankruptcy context,' "
the Court found the Service's unsecured claim should not receive priority.67
Relying upon the its recent decision in U.S. v. Noland,' the Court re-
versed the Tenth Circuit's equitable subordination of the Service's claim.'
Dissenting, Justice Thomas agreed that the Tenth Circuit improperly subordi-
nated the Service's claim, but thought every excise tax should be given §
507(a)(8)(E) status.7 °
C. Analysis
Because the language in § 4971 does not label its assessment as an excise
tax,71 the CF&I Court could have relied upon its decision in United States v.
58. CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1158. In Cassidy, the Tenth Circuit held that "Congress'
labeling of [an] exaction as a tax is not determinative of its status for priority in bankruptcy .... "
Cassidy, 983 F.2d at 163. The CF&I court concluded that the bankruptcy court correctly refused
to treat the Internal Revenue Code's label as determinative for priority in 'bankruptcy purposes.
CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1158.
59. See CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1158.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1159. The Seventh Circuit relied upon legislative history to determine that Con-
gress intended courts to develop the equitable subordination doctrine. In re Virtual Network Servs.
Corp., 902 F.2d at 1249-50.
62. CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1159.
63. The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the circuits over
whether § 4971(a) claims are excise taxes within the meaning of § 507(a)(7)(E) [now §
507(a)(8)(E)], and whether such claims are categorically subject to equitable subordination under §
510(c)." Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. at 2110.
64. Id. at 2114.
65. Id. at 2112. The only reference to the term "excise" is in the title of the chapter in which
§ 4971 is located. Id.
66. Id. at 2113.
67. Id. at 2114.
68. 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) (concluding that categorical reordering of priorities that take
place at the legislative level of consideration is beyond the scope of judicial authority to order
equitable subordination under § 510(c)).
69. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. at 2115.
70. Id. at 2116 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas thought it was "not appropriate...
for federal courts to perform a similar inquiry into valid taxes passed by Congress, and the ma-
jority cites no case in which this Court has denied bankruptcy priority to a congressionally enacted
tax." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. "No inference, implication, or presumption of
legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any par-
19971
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.72 In Ron Pair, the Court held that where the lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Code is plain, "'the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms."" The CF&I Court incorrectly relied74 on
United States v. New York" and United States v. Sotelo.76 In these cases, the
Court refused to rely on the terminology used in relevant tax and bankruptcy
provisions and, instead, followed a functional analysis. The Court could have
used an analysis under Ron Pair, which mandates decisions based on statutory
language, to arrive at the same conclusion and maintain consistency with pre-
cedent.' Instead, the Court relied upon cases which are inconsistent with the
precedent established by Ron Pair and other Supreme Court cases."
The Court properly limited equitable subordination. The results may
harshly punish innocent creditors who take subject to prioritized government
claims.' Congress, however, decided claim priority in the Bankruptcy Code,
ticular section or provision or portion of this title ... ." 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b) (1994).
72. 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (holding that "as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the stat-
ute").
73. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)).
74. See Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. CL at 2111.
75. 315 U.S. 510 (1942). The Court placed no weight on the tax label, looking instead to the
actual effects of the exaction. Id.
76. 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (stating that "[w]e ... cannot agree with the Court of Appeals
that the penalty language of Internal Revenue Code § 6672 is dispositive of the status of
respondent's debt under Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(1)(e)'); see Kwass, supra note 34, at 527
("Sotelo, however, no longer appears to be good law. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent in Sotelo
and endorsed the approach later adopted in Ron Pair.").
77. See Humphrey, supra note 34, at 1082 (approving of the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Ron
Pair in Mansfield Tire); Kwass, supra note 34, at 530 (stating that "the appropriate Supreme
Court standard is derived from the plain meaning rule in United States v. Ron Pair"). "After Ron
Pair... courts should rarely look beyond relevant statutory history to interpret what Congress
intended by enacting a statute." Jeffrey H. Paravano, Postpetition Interest on Oversecured Tax
Liens-Abandonment of the "Nonconsensual" Distinction in Bankruptcy Proceedings: United
States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 42 TAX LAw. 475, 487 (1989).
78. See Humphrey, supra note 34, 1077 n.60 (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,
419-20 (1992) (construing amendments of the bankruptcy laws as not affecting prior law absent
legislative history to the contrary and declaring that "silence in the legislative history to the con-
wary cannot be controlling" where the statute is unambiguous)); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129,
135-36 (1991) (starting with the language of a statute, presuming plain language expresses intent,
and allowing only conclusive legislative history to counter the presumption); Demarest v.
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (stating that "[w]hen... the terms of a statue [are] unam-
biguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances"); Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991) (finding that when language is unambiguous, judicial
inquiry ends). The Supreme Court has been inconsistent interpreting the Code. See Kenneth N.
Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial Legislation, 62
AM. BANKR. LJ. 1, 2 (1988) (criticizing courts for ignoring statutory language); Jeffrey W. Shaw,
Note, Discharging Tax Penalties in Bankruptcy Liquidation: No Relief for the Dishonest Debtor,
10 VA. TAX REv. 801, 803 n.10 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent
when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code). But see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1295 (1990) (arguing statutory interpretation is moving toward textualism).
79. United States v. Nolan, 48 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 1995). The Nolan Court stated:
We do not see the fairness or the justice in permitting the Commissioner's claim for tax
penalties, which are not being assessed because of pecuniary losses to the Internal Reve-
nue Service, to enjoy an equal or higher priority with claims based on the extension of
value to the debtor, whether secured or not.
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and that decision should be respected by the courts.'o Bankruptcy judges will
no longer disrupt tax collection by imposing their own visions of fairness in
place of congressionally mandated priorities.
III. FALuRE TO PAY OVER TAx
A. Background
The Code places a 100% penalty tax on responsible persons who fail to
pay over to the government withheld employee taxes."' The employer's fail-
ure to follow the requirements of §§ 3102(a)82 and 3402(a)13 triggers the
80. See Humphrey, supra note 34, at 1082. Humphrey notes:
While the temptation exists to define congressional policy under the Bankruptcy Code as
a broad mandate to protect innocent creditors, the same Code also evidences a policy to
protect government revenues of almost every nature .... [Wihether Congress provides a
vehicle by which debtors in bankruptcy can be relieved of certain debt is entirely up to
them.
Id. (citation omitted). But see- Stephen W. Sather, Tax Issues in Bankruptcy, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ.
1363, 1375 (1994) ("Generally, courts should allow subordination of tax penalties in a Chapter I 1
plan when a failure to subordinate would dilute the distribution to unsecured creditors. Allowing
the government to receive a penalty before creditors with compensatory claims are paid in full is
not equitable.").
81. 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1994). This penalty statute provides in part:
(a) Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed
by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over
such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat such tax or the payment
thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal
to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid
over. No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 ... for any offense to which this
section is applicable.
Id.
82. 26 U.S.C. § 3102(a) (1994). Section 3102 sets forth the requirements for deductions of
taxes from wages, providing in part that "[tihe tax imposed by section 3101 shall be collected by
the employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when
paid." Id.
83. 26 U.S.C. § 3402(a) (1994). Section 3402 provides requirements for withholdings,
stating in part:
(a) Requirement of withholding.
(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this section, every employer
making payments of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax
determined in accordance with tables or computational procedures prescribed
by the Secretary. Any tables or procedures prescribed under this paragraph
shall-
(A) apply with respect to the amount of wages paid during such
periods as the Secretary may prescribe, and
(B) be in such form, and provide for such amounts to be deducted
and withheld, as the Secretary determines to be most appropriate to
carry out the purposes of this chapter and to reflect the provisions of
Chapter I applicable to such periods.
(2) Amount of wages. For purposes of applying tables or procedures pre-
scribed under paragraph (1), the term "the amount of wages" means the
amount by which the wages exceed the number of withholding exemptions
claimed multiplied by the amount of one such exemption. The amount of each
withholding exemption shall be equal to the amount of one personal exemption
provided in section 151(b), prorated to the payroll period. The maximum num-
ber of withholding exemptions permitted shall be calculated in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary under this section, taking into
account any reduction in withholding to which an employee is entitled under
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penalty. The term "person" includes "an officer or employee of a corporation,
or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or
member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation
occurs."8
4
Following the example set by other circuits, the Tenth Circuit very will-
ingly finds persons responsible under § 6672.5 "A person is responsible
within the meaning of the statute if that person is required to collect, truthfully
account for or pay over any taxes withheld from the wages of a company's
employees."' A managing officer or employee is generally a responsible per-
son." Holding office, controlling financial matters, having authority to spend
funds, owning stock, and hiring and firing employees all indicate responsibili-
ty." A corporate officer retains responsibility even if superiors threaten to
fire the officer if he pays the government."
If a responsible person intentionally prefers other creditors to the Service,
she meets the willfulness requirement under § 6 6 7 2 .' "Willfulness is present
whenever a responsible person 'acts or fails to act consciously and voluntarily
and with knowledge or intent that as a result of his action or inaction trust
funds belonging to the government will not be paid over but will be used for
other purposes.'"'"
Because of varied fact patterns and levels of control held by employees,
courts experience difficulty in developing a bright line test to determine re-
sponsibility." Responsible person status poses a question for the trier of
fact--determined on a case-by-case basis.93 Courts willingly uphold the pro-
visions of § 6672. In doing so, the courts protect government funds, even
when the result harshly imposes a penalty on those with little practical control
this section.
Id.
84. 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b) (1994).
85. Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1993).
86. Id.
87. Id. See also Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
"[the existence of [significant authority], irrespective of whether that authority is actually exer-
cised, is determinative").
88. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032. "Among other things, therefore, a corporate officer or employ-
ee is responsible if he or she has significant, though not necessarily exclusive, authority in the
.general management and fiscal decision making of the corporation.'" Id. (quoting Kissier v. Unit-
ed States, 598 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1979)).
89. See Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir. 1983).
90. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033. In Denbo, the Tenth Circuit stated:
Although negligence does not give rise to § 6672 liability, the willfulness requirement
is... met if the responsible officer shows 'a reckless disregard of a known or obvious
risk that funds may not be remitted to the government.' A responsible person's failure to
investigate or to correct mismanagement after being notified that withholding taxes have
not been paid satisfies the § 6672 willfulness requirement.
Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 894 F.2d 1549, 1554 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Thibodeau
v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1987))).
91. Muck, 3 F.3d at 1381. (quoting Olsen v. United States, 952 F.2d 236, 240 (8th Cir.
1991) (quoting Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1341 (8th Cir. 1976))).
92. Mary A. Bedikian, The Pernicious Reach of 26 U.S.C. Section 6672, 13 VA. TAX REV.
225, 240 (1993).
93. See Jay v. United States, 865 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1989).
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over the payment of creditors." Responsible persons" include sureties,"
accountants, 97 and attorneys.98
The burden of proof falls on the responsible person.99 Assessments
against responsible persons are presumed correct, making it difficult for the
responsible person to meet the burden."m Section 6672 tax imposes joint and
several liability.' ° In addition, § 6672 does not grant a right to contribu-
tion.12
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Taylor v. Internal Revenue Service"3
a. Facts
Oscar and Donald Taylor incorporated Delta Cattle Corporation in 1981,
with business offices in Tulsa and ranches in eastern Oklahoma."° Donald
Taylor was the vice president, and served on the board of directors. 5 He
owned no stock, but he had authorization to write checks, borrow funds, and
hire and fire employees with Oscar's approval."° Taylor's primary responsi-
bility was that of a "cowboy": he did not prepare corporate payrolls, ensure
that taxes were withheld, file quarterly returns, or make quarterly deposits.
94. Bediklan, supra note 92, at 246. Bedikian observed:
[Section 6672] is harsh and far reaching, intended to protect the government when re-
sponsible persons dip into the "trust fund" and deliberately allocate money for uses other
than payment of the tax liability. Regardless of the amount of money involved, which
can be virtually inconsequential, the act itself constitutes a preference over the govern-
ment, thus triggering the assessment. Once the assessment is generated, the taxpayer
faces an extraordinary maze of presumptions and burdens ....
Id. Taxpayers have been successful in only 23 of 270 federal and claims court cases. Id. at 270
n.19.
95. The Service chooses, with complete discretion, against whom it will assert the penalty.
Neier v. United States, 127 B.R. 669, 680 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding that the Service need not seek
collection first from officer who had primary control over payment of trust fund taxes).
96. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United Sates, 422 F.2d 26, 31 (9th Cir. 1970).
97. See Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. IRS, 895 F.2d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that
an accounting firm, which was responsible for the payment of a corporate client's bills, was a
"responsible person" although it was required to present client with copy of bills each month).
98. See IRS v. Blais, 612 F. Supp. 700, 707 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding that a lawyer, who
operated a car dealership under a power of attorney from the owner, was liable for 100% penalty
tax).
99. See Bedikian, supra note 92, at 246. McDermitt v. United States, 954 F.2d 1245, 1251
(6th Cir. 1992); Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740, 742 (6th Cir. 1988); Ruth v. United
States, 823 F.2d 1091, 1093 (7th Cir. 1987); Caldrone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 258 (6th
Cir. 1986); Sinder v. United States, 655 F.2d 729, 731 (6th Cir. 1981).
100. Bedikian, supra note 92, at 246.
101. See Conley v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 1176, 1176-77 (S.D. Ind. 1991); Cline v.
United States, No. 89-73312, 1993 U.S. App. WL 272516 (6th Cir. Jul. 21, 1993). But see Reid v.
United States, 558 F. Supp. 686, 688-89 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (finding federal common law right of
action for contribution or indemnification under section 6672).
102. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 645 (1980) (finding common
law fails to create the rule of contribution in antitrust).
103. 69 F.3d 411 (10th Cir. 1995).
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Taylor did, however, sign one 1984 tax return." In March of 1984, Delta
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 In February of 1985, the IRS sent
Taylor a Notice of Proposed Assessment of 100 Percent Penalty which identi-
fied the quarters of unpaid taxes, the amount of unpaid taxes, and the penalty
amount."° In March of 1995, the IRS assessed the § 6672 penalty against
Taylor."t The bankruptcy court found that Taylor was not a responsible per-
son.' The district court reversed and found that Taylor was a responsible
person." 2 The district court held that Taylor had acted willfully,"3 and re-
jected Taylor's contention that the assessment was void because the IRS as-




The Tenth Circuit stated that "the bankruptcy court's ultimate determina-
tion whether an individual constitutes a 'responsible person'.., involves an
application of law to fact, which is subject to de novo review by the district
court."' ' The Tenth Circuit applied the test for responsible persons estab-
lished in Denbo, agreeing with the district court that Taylor had sufficient con-
trol over operations to qualify as a responsible person." 6 The court found
that the District Court should not have determined the willfulness issue as a
matter of law and remanded for findings of fact."7
The court found that the assessment against Taylor was valid and rejected
Taylor's contention that Stallard v. United States,"8 a Fifth Circuit decision,
prohibited such an assessment."9 The court stated, "[tihe Stallard court ac-
knowledged... that an aggregate, lump sum assessment of § 6672 penalties
is permissible as long as the IRS identifies the particular tax period for which
the taxpayer is liable .... ",o
107. Id. Oscar Taylor, Donald Taylor's brother, was the president; he managed the business
and owned all the stock, making all corporate decisions and determining which checks to write
and which creditors to pay. Id.
108. Id. at 414.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. "The Bankruptcy Court explained that a responsible person 'is the person who within
the corporate structure has the job to see that the withheld taxes are paid.' ... " Id. (quoting 26
U.S.C. § 6672). The Bankruptcy Court found that Oscar Taylor, Donald Taylor's brother, was the
responsible person. Id.




116. Id. at 416. The court pointed out that Taylor managed the daily operations in the busi-
ness office when his brother was not there, and had "the effective power to pay taxes." Id.
117. Id. at 417.
118. 12 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 1994).




2. Bradshaw v. United States'21
a. Facts
In portions of 1985 and 1986, Larry Bradshaw acted as the president of
Heritage Building Products ("Heritage").'n On May 10, 1985, Bradshaw
entered into a credit agreement with Zion First National Bank granting the
bank a lien on Heritage's assets and the right to freeze Heritage's bank ac-
counts if Heritage went into default.'2 On March 15, 1986, Zion determined
that Heritage defaulted and so Zion froze the Heritage accounts. 24 Thus,
Heritage needed Zion's approval for the future use of funds."z Zion refused
approval for payment of withholding taxes with funds from the frozen ac-
counts, despite Bradshaw's request for the funds." Heritage failed to pay
federal withholding taxes to the IRS for the first three quarters of 1986, and
the penalty assessed for late payment in 1985.27 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice assessed a 100% penalty against Bradshaw as a "responsible person"
under § 6672." The district court found that Bradshaw lacked the power to
distribute funds and therefore was not a responsible person.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit relied primarily upon the Second Circuit's decision in
Kalb v. United States,"3 and declared Bradshaw a responsible person under
§ 6672."' The court said that a corporate officer "may not escape liability as
a 'responsible person' under § 6672 by voluntarily entering into agreements
which permit preferring other creditors to the government."' 2 Noting that
Bradshaw granted the bank power to prefer other creditors to the govern-
ment,' "33 the court found he could not avoid responsibility by ceding financial
control."' The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Ninth, 35 Fifth," and Sec-
ond 3" Circuits, which had arrived at similar conclusions.'38 The court said
the only way Bradshaw could have avoided liability was to resign or refuse to
121. 83 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995).








130. 505 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1974).
131. Bradshaw, 83 F.3d at 1182.
132. Id. at 1180.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The fact that a bank exer-
cises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate
officer of liability under § 6672.").
136. Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[o]ne does
not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others").
137. Kalb, 505 F.2d at 510; see Botta v. Scanlon, 314 F.2d 392, 393 (2d Cir. 1963).
138. Bradshaw, 83 F.3d at 1181.
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sign the checks" thereby shutting down the company.39
C. Analysis
One commentator suggested that Congress intended to induce employers
to comply with their duty to pay taxes by imposing severe penalties on the
officials responsible for the employers' decisions."4 By extending the re-
sponsible person designation to an officer with no practical control over the
employer's payment to creditors, the Tenth Circuit imposes harsh consequenc-
es on those unable to avoid them-several commentators would say too
harsh.' 4' The Tenth Circuit may however, intend to protect innocent employ-
ees and the government from the abuse of corporate officers and
shareholders. 42
D. Other Circuits
Several other circuit courts of appeals ruled on the scope of the responsi-
ble person designation in the past year. In most of the cases, the circuit courts
found the taxpayer a responsible person under § 6672." A divided Ninth
139. Id.
140. James E. Hungerford, Howard v. United States: Who Should Be Responsible for the 100
Percent Penalty?, 1989 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 451, 453.
141. See Stephen J. Vasek, The Hidden Tax Trap of I.R.C. Section 6672, 67 Ky. LJ. 27, 73
(1978) (stating that the "[a]pplications of section 6672, as currently interpreted, often imposes a
harsh penalty on morally innocent and unsuspecting business managers"); Hungerford, supra note
140, at 470 (stating that "[i]t is certainly not fair to saddle an individual corporate employee who
is not responsible for the problem with a staggering corporate debt just to provide an alternate
means of collection"); Bedikian, supra note 92, at 238 (stating that "the consequences of extend-
ing the responsible person definition are unjustified and places persons ... in a virtual catch-22:
not following his superior's directive would have subjected him to termination while following the
directive would have subjected him to enormous penalties").
142. See Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1987); Bedikian, supra note 92,
at 231. Bedikian notes:
[Slection 6672 is intended to be a powerful deterrent against the promiscuous or delib-
erate use of money which rightfully belongs to the government. It is only when courts
construe the statute mechanically, without regard to the actual control possessed by the
responsible person, that section 6672 begins to reveal its most pernicious side.
Id.
143. Gadoury v. IRS, No. 95-1872, 1996 WL 83894 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 1996) (unpublished
disposition) (finding a company controller had sufficient control over disbursement of company
funds, admitted that he knew the taxes were not paid, and failed to take remedial steps); Donelan
Phelps & Co. v. United States, 876 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding the managers of company
in reorganization were responsible persons under § 6672); Keller v. United States, 46 F.3d 851
(8th Cir. 1995) (affirming a § 6672 penalty against an estate's personal representative who exer-
cised authority over the operation of an inn owned by the estate, and agreeing with the lower
court that the representative was a responsible person who had acted willfully); Szego v. Com-
missioner, No. CA-89-2186-JFM, 1995 WL 678257 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1995) (unpublished dis-
position) (finding a company's majority shareholder and chairman of the board liable for the
corporation's unpaid employment taxes under § 6672); Ashby v. United States, No. CV-92-00293-
HDM, 1995 WL 635178 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 1995) (unpublished disposition) (affirming a district
court decision holding that a corporation's president was liable as a responsible person under §
6672); United States v. DiMeo, No. CV-89-0617-GLT, 1995 WL 501506 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 1995)
(unpublished disposition) (affirming a district court decision holding a man liable for a company's
unpaid employment taxes as a responsible person under § 6672); Snyder v. Talon, No. CV-93-
2722, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 597121 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1993) (ruling that a bankruptcy court prop-
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Circuit ruled that gross negligence sufficed to establish the willfulness require-
ment of § 6672.'" The Sixth Circuit held that a company president's failure
to remit overdue withholding taxes was not willful, because a state statute en-
cumbered his use of the available funds.45
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in CF&I Fabricators arrives at the correct
conclusion, but by the wrong analysis. Instead of simply noting that the term
"excise" does not directly fall within § 4971 and by applying a functional
analysis, the Court relied upon its decisions in United States v. New York and
United States v. Sotelo. These cases-inconsistent with the Court's decision in
Ron Pair--open the door for courts to look beyond the direction imposed by
Congress to further their own agendas.
Because the Tenth and other Circuits have expanded the responsible per-
son definition, courts may assess huge penalties against unwitting employees
with little practical control over company actions. These employees can avoid
the penalty only by quitting their jobs when they discover that their employer
has failed to pay proper employment taxes. These harsh consequences, howev-
er, protect innocent employees and government revenue from abuse by corpo-
rate officers and shareholders.
Michael T. Lininger
erly denied a debtor's motion to reconsider a sumnmary judgment in favor of the IRS, because the
debtor's motion did not present any new issues).
144. Phillips v. IRS, 73 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1996).
145. Huizinga v. United States, 68 F.3d 139, 144 (6th Cir. 1995).
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